Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Vagueness, philosophy: there are descriptions of objects or situations that are necessarily not fully determined. For example, the indication whether a given hue is still red or already orange is not always decidable. It is a property of the language to provide vague predicates. Whether vagueness is a property of the world is controversial. See also sorites, indeterminacy, under-determinateness, intensification, penumbra._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Logic Texts on Vagueness - Dictionary of Arguments
Read III 210 Vagueness/Max Black: Vagueness is not ambiguity and also not generality. It can be difficult to draw a line between what is a chair, and what is not. Here, vagueness sets in and threatens the Sorites. >Sorites, >Ambiguity. Read III 211 Vagueness: the world itself is not vague. There are no vague objects. Read III 216 E.g. Everest, Gaurisankar: Suppose it is vague exactly where a mountain begins and where it ends. And vague, whether Everest and Gaurisankar are identical (for it is unclear whether their half-shadows are the same). So the Everest has the property of being Gaurisankar in a vague way. If the boundary (interpretation or naming) is vague between two things, one is the other in a vague way. >Name, >Naming, >Reference, >Predication. But Gaurisankar does not have this property! It is clear that Gaurisankar is Gaurisankar. (Like Everest is Everest) (> properties / >limits). This is the reason why there are no vague objects. Sorites/Vagueness: Gaurisankar is in a vague way Mt. Everest. But: in a certain way Gaurisankar. Attributive adjectives: big for mouse/small for elephant - but there are no vague objects. Sorites: separation of the "truth predicates": "not not little" is unequal "little". External negation/Carnap: "~ ~ A" is not meaningful in vagueness. Read III 230 The degree distributions do not function like probabilistic distributions. Blur: does not help in Sorites - degree distribution is not probability distribution. Read III 232 The blur suggests that the grid we place over reality does not exactly correspond to our concepts. --- Sainsbury V 54 Epistemic theory of vagueness/Read: a fact is present, but not knowable. > Causal theory of knowledge: must not have happened by chance. Tolerant concepts, no knowledge - yet vague predicates draw sharp boundaries. Sainsbury V 56 Intensification theory/vagueness/Sainsbury: Thesis: not all premises should be true. + Sainsbury V 72 Omniscience/vagueness/Sainsbury: e.g. whether this object is red, an omniscient being cannot answer better than we do. >Omniscience._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Logic Texts
> Counter arguments in relation to Vagueness
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29